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Abstract15
In this introduction to the special section on globalization, regionalization, and multi-polarity,
Q2
16
we review social network analysis applications to the study of globalization as a complex17
and multi-dimensional phenomenon and we explore the frontiers of our knowledge about the18
network properties of global systems. We focus on the global economic (trade and investment),19
political, and migration systems.20
Keywords: globalization, regionalization, multi-polarity, trade networks, economics21
1 Introduction22
Network science has already demonstrated its usefulness in many areas of the social23
and natural sciences at various levels of aggregation. At the knowledge frontier of24
this field, we find the exploration of new fields of application very much depend25
on data availability and the further development of analytical techniques. In this26
introductory article, we review social network analysis applications to the study of27
globalization as a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon and we explore the28
frontiers of our knowledge about the network properties of global systems. We will29
thereby focus on the global economic (trade and investment), political, and migration30
systems. Applications of network research to global systems of connections and flows31
in other dimensions will thus not be reviewed.132
1 These include applications in the area of global epidemiological networks, global transport networks,
and global land acquisition. See e.g., Balcan et al. (2009), Kaluza et al. (2010), and Seaquist et al.
(2014).
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The globalization concept refers to an underlying hypothesis about the increasingly33
global scope of relevant flows and interactions. However, competing hypotheses34
refer to the persistence of regional subsystems, hierarchies in the global systems,35
North–South and/or center-periphery patterns, and (multi-)polarities. These tensions36
between globalization, regionalization, and multi-polarity are at the heart of this37
project, and which has resulted in this special section of Network Science.38
This introductory article is structured as follows: In Section 2, we start by39
presenting the problem of measurement of globalization, how indicators have been40
developed for that purpose, their strengths and weaknesses, and what the possible41
value added of a network approach could be. In Sections 3–7, we focus on global42
and regional network features in the following domains: global trade and production43
(Section 3), global investment (Section 4), global migration (Section 5), trade and44
investment agreements (Section 6), and the global polity (Section 7). This is followed45
by concluding remarks and an overview of the papers included in the special section46
of this issue.47
2 The measurement of globalization48
In order to establish the value of network analysis for the understanding and49
measurement of globalization, we briefly review the development of globalization50
indicators to date. Our purpose is two-fold. First, some of the technical limitations of51
these indicators can effectively be tackled by a network approach. Second, the work52
on globalization indicators shows the importance of carefully matching measurement53
techniques with conceptualizations of globalization.54
The experience with globalization indicators can be traced back to the work55
on indicators of international openness and competitiveness (De Lombaerde &56
Iapadre, 2011; Martens et al., 2015). This includes the competitiveness indicators57
of the World Economic Forum published since 1979 (Lo´pez-Claros et al., 2006),58
the indicators of economic freedom of Gwartney and Lawson published since 199659
(Gwartney et al., 1996; Gwartney & Lawson, 2006), and the World Market Research60
Center globalization index (G-index) (Randolph, 2001). The underlying definition of61
globalization was initially thus clearly unidimensional: globalization was considered62
as synonymous to economic globalization.63
Globalization was defined by Brahmbhatt (1998: 2) as “the increasing freedom64
and ability of individuals and firms to undertake voluntary economic transactions65
with residents of other countries, a process entailing a growing contestability of66
national markets by foreign suppliers.” For the World Markets Research Center,67
globalization shows “the ever closer knitting together of a one-world economy”68
(Randolph, 2001: 5). And for the OECD, globalization “refers above all to a69
dynamic and multidimensional process of economic integration whereby national70
resources become more and more internationally mobile while national economies71
become increasingly interdependent” (OECD, 2005a: 11).72
By the late 1990s, a multi-dimensional conception of globalization came to the73
fore (Held et al., 1999; Scholte, 2000; Martens et al., 2015) which consequently Q374
inspired new (multi-dimensional) measurements. For Scholte (2002: 13–14), for75
example, globalization should be understood “as the spread of transplanetary – and76
in recent times more particularly supraterritorial – connections between people [. . . ]77
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globalization involves reductions in barriers to transworld contacts. People become78
more able – physically, legally, culturally, and psychologically – to engage with each79
other in ‘one world’ [. . . ] globalization refers to a shift in the nature of social space.”80
This multi-dimensional conception was reflected in the construction of composite81
globalization indicators such as the well-known A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Mag-82
azine G-index (A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Magazine, 2001-2007). This indicator83
combined the economic, technological, political, and personal dimensions of glob-84
alization.2 It consists therefore of four components: (i) the degree of integration of85
its economy into the world economy, (ii) the internationalization of the personal86
contacts of its citizens, (iii) the use of internet technology, and (iv) the extent of its87
international political engagement.88
Other indicator proposals shared the underlying multi-dimensional conception89
of globalization (Lockwood, 2001, 2004; Lockwood & Redoano, 2005; Heshmati,90
2006).3 The two most important (and sustained) recent efforts to build globalization91
indicators are the one built at the University of Maastricht and the one built at KOF92
(KOF, 2011). In the former case (Zywietz, 2003; Martens & Zywietz, 2004, 2006;93
Figge & Martens, 2014), the authors adopt a broad definition of globalization: “the94
intensification of cross-national cultural, economic, political, social and technological95
interactions that lead to the establishment of transnational structures and the global96
integration of cultural, economic, environmental, political and social processes on97
global, supranational, national, regional and local levels” (Rennen & Martens, 2003:98
143). Compared to previous indicators, two additional dimensions are added: (i) the99
global involvement of a country’s military-industrial complex and (ii) globalization100
in the ecological domain.101
The globalization concept on which the KOF indicator is based refers to a process102
of “creating networks of connections among actors at multi-continental distances,103
mediated through a variety of flows including people, information and ideas,104
capital, and goods,” a process “that erodes national boundaries, integrates national105
economies, cultures, technologies and governance, and produces complex relations106
of mutual interdependence” (Dreher, 2006: 3). The KOF indicator distinguishes107
itself by the expansion of the personal contact and information flow variables, and108
the incorporation of a cultural convergence variable and economic policy variables.109
Although these globalization indicators have shown to be useful in econometric110
analyses (Potrafke, 2014), there are a number of methodological issues that have111
been raised. A first is the obvious problem of weighting and aggregation in the112
construction of the composite indices (Lockwood, 2001; Martens & Zywietz, 2004,113
2006; Heshmati, 2006; Martens & Raza, 2008; De Lombaerde & Iapadre, 2008,114
2011). In the most recent revision of the KOF index, de facto globalization is115
distinguished from de jure globalization (Gygli et al., 2018).4116
2 The construction of this globalization index was inspired by the Human Development Index (UNDP,
1998).
3 For an overview of distinct proposals, their dimensions and variables, see De Lombaerde & Iapadre
(2008, 2011) and Dreher et al. (2008). Kluver & Fu (2004) have argued to bring the cultural dimension
to the core of the measurement of globalization.
4 See also, De Lombaerde & Iapadre (2008, 2011) on the need to distinguish between indicators of de
facto globalization and indicators of globalization policies.
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A second issue refers to the fact that the flow variables on which the globalization117
indicators are based (trade, investment, telecommunications, tourism, etc.) inform118
us about the openness of countries rather than about their globalization. Thus, it119
has been argued that constructed globalization indicators do not necessarily inform120
about the distribution and reach of international relationships (IRs) of a country,121
and that alternative indicators are therefore needed (De Lombaerde & Iapadre,122
2008, 2011; Vujakovic, 2010). This issue refers also to the question whether the123
international integration of a country is global or instead, regional. As will be124
shown in the various contributions to this special section of Network Science, social125
network analysis is an appropriate tool to shed more light on the distribution and126
reach of IRs in the global system. Network-based measures could constitute a useful127
complement to the existing globalization indicators.128
A third issue refers to methodological territorialism which characterizes the quan-129
titative study of globalization (Scholte, 2002). Globalization measures based on130
alternative groupings of people, alternative places (e.g., cities),5 or even individuals,131
would also reveal interesting insights in the dynamics of globalization. Network132
research is well equipped to face this challenge, provided that the necessary data133
exist.134
3 Network analysis of global trade and production patterns135
As mentioned before, the recent definitions and conceptualization of globaliza-136
tion emphasize the multi-dimensionality and the complexity of the phenomenon.137
These aspects are also very evident considering specifically international trade138
between countries, one of the main manifestations of globalization. The growth139
of international trade has allowed the integration of national markets and the140
widespread availability of goods, services, and intermediate inputs produced at far141
away locations. But this growth did not only imply larger volumes of trade: during142
the past decades, the number of countries actively involved in international trade143
increased, while at the same time exchanges across countries expanded from trade in144
goods to include more services and what is sometimes called trade in tasks—tasks are145
embodied in semi-processed goods crossing borders along the production process.146
As the increasing complexity of the observed patterns of international trade147
suggests, to understand international trade, and its consequences on macroeconomic148
dynamics, it is not sufficient to look at each single country in isolation, or to the149
linkages it holds with its direct trade partners. One needs a more holistic perspective,150
where countries are seen embedded in the whole web of trade relationships. This151
is precisely what is provided by a network view of international trade. In such a152
systemic view, countries are characterized not only by how much they trade, but also153
by whom they trade with, and by their overall connection with the trading system.154
In this context, the integration or connectivity of a country depends on whether it155
trades with countries that trade a lot, or if it trades with pairs of countries that156
are themselves trade partners; if it is embedded in tightly connected groups (or157
communities) of countries, relatively disconnected to others; and so on. The overall158
5 On city networks, see e.g., Taylor et al. (2002) and Taylor (2004).
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structure of relationships will tell whether a country is systemically important (or159
central) in the whole web of trade system and it will provide information on how160
exposed its economy is to external shocks.161
The relevance of this view has generated recently a number of papers, following162
the pioneering work by Smith & White (1992) analyzing the characteristics of the163
world trade network (WTN).6 From these analyses, some important features of the164
WTN emerge. The WTN is a dense graph compared to other real-world networks:165
its density is larger than 0.50, and in the period 1950–2010, the WTN has shown166
a marked increase in the number of direct linkages and a (weak) positive trend in167
density (De Benedictis & Tajoli, 2011; Garlaschelli & Loffredo, 2005; De Benedictis168
et al., 2014). This occurs irrespective of whether or not one factors in any increase169
in the number of countries in the sample, due (for example) to improvements in170
data collection or new-born countries. Therefore, trade globalization has not only171
strengthened the connections among countries that were already trading back in172
1950 (increasing the “intensive margin,” as it is called in the international trade173
literature), but also embedded newcomers in the trade web over the years, inducing174
a stronger trade integration (increasing the so-called extensive margin). Still, it is175
important to highlight that a density close to 0.6 means that nearly half of all176
possible bilateral relations are not exploited. In other words, most countries do not177
trade with all the others, but they rather select their partners.178
Another important feature of the WTN is the non-uniform structure of the179
network. For example, the distribution of the number of export and import partners180
of each country (i.e., in-degree and out-degree in terms of trade linkages) has become181
more and more bimodal over time, with a group of highly connected countries co-182
existing with another group characterized by a smaller number of inward and183
outward links. Thus, one is not able to talk of a representative country in terms of184
trade patterns. According to some works, the WTN is disassortative (see Fagiolo,185
2010), but this property is not so well established, and results differ when binary or186
a weighted network data are available.187
Despite trade globalization, the WTN is still a strongly modular network. Ge-188
ography affects trade flows, in spite of the decline in transportation costs, and189
continental partitions of the WTN display a higher level of cohesion than the190
whole system. Furthermore, economic and political factors push countries to form191
over time relatively stable modular patterns of multilateral trade relations, pos-192
sibly interacting among them, which can be easily identified through network193
analysis.194
Community-detection techniques (Fortunato, 2010) applied to the WTN allow Q4195
one to identify several clusters of countries forming tightly connected trade groups196
(Barigozzi et al., 2011; Piccardi & Tajoli, 2015). These groups tend to mimic Q5197
geographical partitions of the world in macro areas but are less overlapping with198
existing preferential trade agreements. This confirms previous findings of the trade199
literature that show the difficulty in assessing the exact impact of trade agreements200
on trade flows (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007). Many of the identified communities of201
countries in the WTN appear to have weak “statistical significance” (Piccardi &202
6 See also, Serrano & Bogun˜a (2003), Serrano et al. (2007), and Fagiolo et al. (2007, 2008).
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Tajoli, 2012) because inter-community linkages are very relevant, providing support203
for the WTN as a globalized trading system.204
The above-mentioned properties apply to the aggregate WTN; that is, to the205
network formed by total trade flows between countries. The WTN can also be206
analyzed by considering separate trade flows of different categories of goods, as207
done for example, by Barigozzi et al. (2010), De Benedictis and Tajoli (2010), and Q6
Q7
208
De Benedictis et al., (2014). Results from these analyses show that commodity-209
specific networks are strongly heterogeneous and their properties are statistically210
different from the aggregate one. Many commodity-specific layers of the WTN211
are not even fully connected. Nearly full connectivity at the aggregate level is212
mainly achieved through the presence of specific links that keep commodity-specific213
networks together.214
Another interesting application of network analysis to a specific type of in-215
ternational trade links considers trade flows among countries generated by the216
so-called global value chains or international production networks (Cingolani et al.,217
2017, 2018). The analysis of the networks formed by trade links due to trade218
in intermediate goods to assemble final products and combining the production219
capacity of different countries allows to better understand how these international220
production structures are organized and which countries play a more central role in221
them.222
These results add information to the more traditional econometric analysis of223
the pattern of trade across countries, using mainly the gravity model. The gravity224
model applied to bilateral trade flows is based in the individual characteristics of225
the trading country pair, even if the theoretical derivation of the model strongly226
suggests to take into due consideration the general context of world markets in227
which the countries are embedded. Empirically, this should be done by introducing228
the so-called “multilateral resistance” in the econometric specification (Anderson229
& van Wincoop, 2003), but within the traditional approach finding an appropriate230
variable to measure this term is not an easy task.231
This can be done more explicitly in a network context, as the network allows to232
examine how countries’ structural locations in the global trade network influence233
their bilateral trade, as it is done, for example, by Zhu and Park (2012). The234
authors identify a cohesion effect of structural equivalence (the degree to which235
two nodes have similar ties with other nodes in the network) in global trade: two236
structurally equivalent countries develop more bilateral trade even after controlling237
for conventional dyadic factors. Also, Ward et al. (2013) argue that there are theo-238
retical as well as empirical reasons to expect network dependencies in international239
trade and they should be taken into due account in econometric exercises. Fagiolo240
(2010) offers an interesting comparative analysis of different empirical approaches241
to international trade. The paper shows that the residuals of a gravity specification242
of trade flows, where trade-link weights are depurated from geographical distance,243
size, border effects, trade agreements, are not at all random, but display marked244
signs of a complex system. Building on these results, Duenas & Fagiolo (2013)245
show that the gravity model estimates of trade flows are very poor in replicating246
the observed binary architecture of the WTN and it is not able to explain higher247
order statistics that, like clustering, require the knowledge of triadic link-weight248
topological patterns. These comparisons confirm the contribution of the network249
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analysis to the understanding of trade patterns, and provide useful insights for the250
theoretical and empirical models of trade.251
4 Network analysis of global investment252
International production and investment is a domain in which network analysis can253
play a useful role. The “double network” theory of multinational enterprises (MNEs)254
is based on the idea that innovation and value creation result from the interaction255
between the internal network connecting headquarters to affiliates and the external256
networks of relationships between each affiliate and its host economy (Cantwell,257
1995; Zanfei, 2000). In principle, at the firm level, this approach can be applied to258
both national and multinational groups; however, it can be particularly useful when259
studying the specific advantages that MNEs draw from their cross-border network260
organization. These networks are related to their strategic interactions with other261
agents, such as trade unions and governments (Ietto-Gillies, 2000).262
It has also been observed, however, that the actual geographic scope of the263
activities of MNEs is not necessarily global; rather, it is often regional. And even if264
final goods are sold in global markets, most of the manufacturing production is often265
spread among production locations in countries from the same region (Rugman &266
Verbeke, 2004; Rugman, 2005, 2008).267
Network research has been applied to the study of the internal network of MNEs268
at the firm level. Vitali et al. (2011) focus on the control network of transnational269
corporations, to understand how its structure affects market competition and270
financial stability at the global level. These researchers describe the architecture of271
the international ownership network, and compute the control held by each global272
player. Their results allow identifying a giant bow-tie structure, largely controlled by273
a small core of interconnected financial institutions. In a follow-up paper, Vitali &274
Battiston (2014) study the community structure of the global corporate network and275
find that it is strongly influenced by the geographic location of firms. Altomonte &276
Rungi (2013) explore the structure of national and multinational business groups,277
conceived as knowledge-based hierarchical networks. The trade-off between knowl-278
edge exploitation and communication costs within the group is analyzed through279
an entropy-like index, which measures the hierarchical complexity of the group.280
De Masi et al. (2013) apply complex network analysis to the study of Italian281
multinationals, in order to identify, at the sector level, the key nodes of the system in282
terms of investing firms and countries of destination. Joyez (2017) performs a similar283
analysis on French multinationals, showing the increasing geographic diversification284
of their location strategies.285
A related strand of literature deals with the structure of production networks,286
in order to understand its macroeconomic effects (see, e.g., Battiston et al., 2007b;287
Acemoglu et al., 2012). This literature feeds into a more general approach, aimed288
at representing real and financial markets as a complex evolving system of coupled289
networks of interacting agents (Doyne Farmer et al., 2012). The properties of this290
system can allow a better understanding of sudden changes of status and crises.291
At the macroeconomic level, aggregating the cross-border control networks of292
MNEs can lead to build a network of foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks, whose293
nodes are the home or host countries of investing firms. This can help overcome294
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the problems created by the lack of a comprehensive source of bilateral FDI data,295
similar to what is available for the international trade network.7 As in other types296
of economic networks, geographic distance can prove to be an important factor297
shaping the structure of FDI networks. Recent research on ownership networks at298
the firm level seems to support this intuition (see, e.g., Vitali & Battiston, 2011).299
Metulini et al. (2017) study the effects of FDI on trade, analyzing the corporate300
control network, which connects (directly and indirectly) origin and destination301
countries. They assume that the network’s structure is affected by MNEs’ attempts302
to minimize tax burden and coordination costs, as well as to overcome market access303
barriers.304
Economic geography shows that in many cases the specific features of local305
systems can be more relevant than national factors in explaining the location306
strategies of MNEs and their effects (Iammarino & McCann, 2013). A promising307
avenue of further research that can be relevant for FDI is the study of spatially em-308
bedded networks. In particular, the degree of local embeddedness of MNEs external309
networks (Andersson & Forsgren, 1996) as well as the absorption capacity of host310
economies, have an important influence on control, value creation, and innovation.311
In economic geography, network analysis has been used to study the structure of312
local and trans-local linkages among firms belonging to industrial clusters, distin-313
guishing between buyer–supplier, partnership, and investment linkages (Turkina et al.314
2016). Alderson & Beckfield (2004) study the network of global cities on the basis315
of information about the location of the 500 largest MNEs’ subsidiaries. Battiston316
et al. (2007a) start from data on employment and ownership shares at business317
level to build the network of inward and outward investment stocks of European318
regions. Crescenzi et al. (2017) use data on green field investment projects to analyze319
linkages among European cities, including those in neighboring regions, and identify320
hierarchical network structures, differentiated by sector and business function.321
5 Network analysis of global migration322
The fact that there have been very few network analysis applications to the global323
migration system is due to the fact that only very recently global matrices of324
bilateral migration stocks (and indirectly, flows) have become available. There is325
earlier work that applies network approaches to intra-national (i.e., inter-regional326
and inter-state) migration flows (Maier & Vyborny, 2005). There are also earlier327
studies on network effects in international migration, but—strictly speaking—these328
do not rely on a network analysis of the global system. These network effects refer329
to agglomeration effects in international migration whereby networks of immigrants330
in specific contexts (destination countries) attract more immigrants from the same331
origin. This has led to qualitative research in sociology and anthropology, and some332
quantitative research (Munshi, 2003; World Bank, 2008). In gravity-type models333
of bilateral migration flows, for example, network effects are proxied by including334
7 In the case of portfolio investment, official bilateral data is available in the IMF Coordinated Portfolio
Investment Survey. Song et al. (2009) use this data to study the statistical properties of the world
investment network. Joseph et al. (2014) analyze different types of international portfolio investment
to identify early-warning network indicators of financial crises. Zhang et al. (2016) build a multi-layer
network of the world economy to compare the topology of portfolio investment and trade networks.
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migrant stocks in destination countries as an explanatory variable (Bao et al., 2009;335
Marques, 2010; Jayet et al., 2010). This variable has shown to produce significant336
effects on the decision-to-migrate.337
However, these gravity-type models do not take full benefit of all the information338
incorporated in the global system of migration flows. This requires a network339
analysis of the global matrices. In addition, only global bilateral matrices allow to340
systematically study regional clustering/density and the effects of regional migration341
policies (Ceccorulli et al., 2011; Deacon et al., 2011) and the changing patterns in342
North–South and South–South migration (De Lombaerde et al., 2014). The currently343
available matrices, based on census or population register data on foreign-born344
population (in combination with data on nationality and estimation techniques),345
have been developed by the World Bank (O¨zden et al., 2011) and UNDESA (2008,346
2013), and have benefited from pioneering work at the University of Sussex (Parsons347
et al., 2007). In the 2015 Revision of UNDESA, data are available on a 5-yearly348
basis from 1990 to 2015.349
The information which is available in these matrices is a combination of historical350
data and estimations. Such information reveals not only the lack of data for a351
number of countries and years but also a number of conceptual and methodological352
difficulties, which are largely specific to migration and which will continue to play a353
role in the foreseeable future. Therefore, network applications in this area will face354
certain limitations. A first difficulty relates to the fact that national legislations and355
records on migration and citizenship are very diverse. This diversity has implications356
for the definition of migrants, their registration, and the comparability of resulting357
statistics. The UN has tried to harmonize concepts, but this does not completely solve358
the problem (Bilsborrow et al., 1997; UNSD, 1998; IOM, 2004). In the World Bank359
project, data were combined for “migrants” according to the place of birth criterion360
(which is the preferred criterion) and the nationality criterion. In addition, missing361
data were/are estimated. A second difficulty arises from the growing mobility of362
people and the multiplication and sophistication of the modalities of that mobility.363
It is getting more and more difficult to establish a clear distinction between patterns364
of mobility and migration.365
The recent availability of global bilateral migration data has thus led to interesting366
descriptive work (including the use of network indicators) (O¨zden et al., 2011;367
Davis et al., 2013; Abel & Sanders, 2014), which allows observers to have a better368
(quantified) grasp of the phenomenon; however, the full potential of networks when369
applied to the global migration system in more (theory-based) analytical work has370
yet to materialize. How far this analysis will be able to reach, will depend—among371
other things—on the possibility of obtaining yearly data, disaggregated by categories.372
6 Network analysis of trade and investment agreements373
The growing array of bilateral and plurilateral agreements aimed at regulating and374
facilitating international trade and investment stands out as a natural domain for375
the application of social network analysis.8376
8 Network analysis can be applied to the study of any global governance system based on a set of
international agreements. For example, Kim (2013) studies multilateral environmental agreements,
working on the network of their reciprocal citations.
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This is particularly clear if one considers the long standing theoretical and377
policy debate on the relationship between regional integration agreements and the378
multilateral trading system (WTO, 2011). One of the main issues under discussion379
concerns to what extent and under which conditions the growth in the number380
of preferential agreements might lead to a long-term result, which resembles a381
complete multilateral liberalization of world trade. In other words, does the network382
of bilateral agreements become so dense as to turn itself into a fully connected383
decentralized world network? And if so, how?384
Starting from strategic models of social and economic networks (Jackson &385
Wolinsky, 1996), a strand of literature studies the establishment of trade agreements386
as a network formation game. Goyal & Joshi (2006) show that a network of387
bilateral trade agreements among symmetric countries can lead to a stable global388
free trade equilibrium. Furusawa & Konishi (2007) compare free trade agreements389
and customs unions, in a view to understand their possible contribution to global390
trade liberalization. Saggi & Yildiz (2010, 2011) extend this result and explore its391
limitations. Mauleon et al. (2010) analyze the trade-off between the stability and the392
efficiency of different outcomes of the network formation game. Zhang et al. (2014)393
offer a dynamic extension of these models, reinforcing their main conclusion about394
the tendency toward global free trade. On the other hand, Manger et al. (2012) use395
longitudinal network analysis techniques to study the formation of preferential trade396
agreements, showing that there are incentives for the emergence of a hierarchical397
structure, in which least developed countries tend to remain marginalized.398
Most of the above models share the idea that governments are myopic in their399
decisions about free trade agreements, as they tend to neglect possible future changes400
in the structure of the network. Departing from this assumption and building on401
the concept of farsightedly stable networks (Herrings et al., 2009), Zhang et al.402
(2013) show that global free trade may be the result of a gradual addition of403
bilateral agreements, even if the process may require the dissolution of some of the404
already existing ones. However, Lake (2017), starting from the idea that parties in a405
bilateral agreement may face incentives to exclude third countries from its extension,406
shows that preferential agreements can reveal to be stumbling blocks against the407
achievement of global free trade.408
Another strand of literature addresses the impact of preferential trade agreements409
on the structure of the WTN. For example, Reyes et al. (2014) use the techniques410
of complex network analysis to show that regional integration agreements have411
exerted an increasing influence on the community partition of the WTN. However,412
they also find that other factors, such as trade growth in South East Asia, have413
countered this influence in some periods. Piccardi & Tajoli (2015) show that the414
effect of preferential agreements on the actual network of trade flows is rather weak,415
suggesting that forces driving globalization have prevailed, also as a consequence of416
the gradual erosion of preference margins.417
The literature on international investment treaties shows clearly the inadequacy of418
a dyadic approach to explain their growth (see Jandhyala et al., 2011). Yet, studies419
using network analysis to understand the formation of bilateral investment treaties420
(BITs) are still scarce. One example is Saban et al. (2010), who use a dynamic version421
of complex network analysis to show that a generalized preferential attachment422
model (Baraba`si et al., 2002) can explain the growth of BITs between 1959 and423
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2005, and that their network shows signs of saturation. More recently, Rozenas et al.424
(2017), starting from the observation that the conclusion of a BIT may conceal425
the underlying asymmetric nature of the relationship between its parties, propose a426
probabilistic method to identify the unobserved asymmetric network of BITs from427
the observable network of undirected links between signatory countries.428
7 Network analysis of the global polity429
The application of network analysis to IRs and politics in the global polity within430
mainstream IR scholarship is relatively recent (Bonacich, 1987; Beckfield, 2003,431
2008; Ingram et al., 2005; Hafner-Burton & Montgomery, 2006; Brams et al., 2006;432
Maoz et al., 2006; Hughes et al., 2009; Hafner-Burton et al., 2009; Maoz, 2011)433
and it is argued that a network approach is underused in IR (Hafner-Burton &434
Montgomery, 2010). Its value has been very well demonstrated by Hafner-Burton435
(2010), for example, in three cases (research on: joint membership of international436
organizations and the occurrence of conflict, alliance hierarchy and defense spending,437
and international trade and labor standards).438
Power is the variable which is at the heart of the IR research program, at least439
in the realist tradition in the field (Morgenthau, 1960). According to neo-realists,440
power refers to relative material capabilities of states to influence or enforce the441
behavior of other states (Waltz, 1979; Barnett &Duvall, 2005). Although there is442
an awareness that a distinction should be made between power potential (material443
capabilities) and actual exercise of power, empirical analyses usually focus on the444
former as the capabilities are easier to quantify.9 In network applications to the445
global polity, there seems to be a consensus that power is a multi-dimensional446
phenomenon. Network analysis is therefore often based on combinations of flow data447
in, for instance, the political, security/military, and economic spheres. In the political448
sphere, the networks that are mostly analyzed are the ones built on ties showing449
diplomatic presence/representation and ties showing coinciding memberships of450
international organizations (Snyder & Kick, 1979). In the security/military sphere,451
the quantifiable variables show either the presence of a cooperative tie (e.g.,452
existence of an alliance or joint membership of an alliance, weapons trade), a453
conflictive tie (e.g., existence of conflicts), or the presence of transnational actors454
(e.g., extraterritorially present military troops, terrorist networks). The fact that also455
economic flows are covered implies some overlap in the networks that are covered456
between disciplinary approaches (see above). For instance, political scientists include457
trade data in their analysis because they claim that the trade patterns can reveal458
sources of power (Hafner-Burton & Montgomery, 2009). Sometimes these trade459
flows are filtered and/or expressed as percentages of respective GDPs in order to460
extract dependency relationships (Van Rossem, 1996).10 For several of the variables461
that are used (especially the political ones but also, for example, the presence of462
foreign troops) turning undirected binary ties into directed ties (“A dependent on463
9 This distinction corresponds with Keohane and Nye’s conceptualization of resource power versus
behavioral power (Keohane & Nye 1998: 86).
10 Compare with the calculation of hubness indicators (Baldwin, 2004). For an application to the analysis
of regional centrality of the BRICs, see Chen & De Lombaerde (2014).
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B” or “A exercising power over B”) is a challenge and ambiguity is not always464
completely solved. Weighting the ties is similarly problematic for certain variables.465
Power is thus not only a matter of relative material capabilities, but it is also related466
to the position of the states in the global political/economic system. In other words,467
relative power is acquired by means of the (intensity and structure of) relationships468
that exist between states and other states. As these feature asymmetries that generate469
dependencies of one state over another and centralities that increase the prominence470
of some states over the other, they are a source of power. The application of471
network measures to the study of power (and influence) in an international context,472
is therefore related to a distinct understanding of power as relational power or network473
power. Thus, network approaches challenge the conventional conception of power;474
power is defined in terms of social power (connectedness), brokerage, and exit options475
(Hafner-Burton et al., 2009; Hufner-Burton & Montgomery, 2010). Relational power476
can be assessed, for example, by calculating centrality indicators. According to477
Hufner-Burton and Montgomery (2010), centrality measures in this context can be478
thought of in three classes of measures: access (degree and related measures such479
as eigenvector), brokerage (betweenness-related measures), and efficiency (closeness-480
related measures). Disparities in the relative centrality of states can thus lead to481
conditions of distrust and conflict.482
Network-based applications along these lines are connected to the broader483
recent literature on globalization, multi-polarity/non-polarity (Haass, 2008), and484
the shifting power balance in favor of the emerging countries, especially from Asia–485
Pacific and the BRICs. Although there is a tendency to recognize the existence of486
power shifts (especially regarding China), this literature is not completely conclusive487
as the empirical results depend heavily on the length of the period of observation488
and the selected variables. Contrary to certain expectations (e.g., related to the489
BRICs as emerging economic powers), evidence seems to suggest that it is rather490
in the political sphere that power is (relatively) shifting toward emerging powers491
(Beckfield, 2008; Hafner-Burton & Montgomery, 2009).492
It should be observed, however, that not only neo-realism is providing a theoretical493
framework for these network analyses, but that also world-systems analysis has494
inspired network analyses of the global polity (and economy) (Snyder & Kick, 1979;495
Breiger, 1981; Nemeth & Smith, 1985; Smith & White, 1992; Van Rossem, 1996;496
Kick & Davis, 2001; Mahutga, 2006; Clark & Beckfield, 2009; Mahutga & Smith,497
2011). For an overview of network applications within the world-system paradigm,498
we refer to Lloyd et al. (2009). Whereas neo-realists view the international system as499
anarchic, proponents of the world-systems approach emphasize the core-periphery500
(hierarchical) structure of the global system and explain the economic logic and501
long-term dynamics behind it (Wallerstein, 1974; Arrighi, 1998). Q8502
World-systems analysis has also inspired a specific conceptualization of power as503
prominence. In the global polity, countries are more prominent to the extent that504
more countries depend (directly or indirectly) on them. Thus, prominence combines505
centrality with dependence. And dependence is thereby not only based on the nature506
of bilateral relationships but rather on how countries are connected to the global507
system as a whole. This hierarchical conception of power has been operationalized508
by Van Rossem (1996) and Jacobs & Van Rossem (2014a) by applying the triad-509
census technique (Hummell & Sodeur, 1987). The underlying criterion of the latter510
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is an alternative for the structural equivalence criterion which was used earlier in511
blockmodeling techniques to detect groups of countries playing similar roles in the512
global polity (Snyder & Kick, 1979).11513
Because of its Marxian imprint, this approach tends to emphasize the dominance514
of economic networks (and sources of power) over political networks (and sources of515
power). This contrasts with the mainstream approaches where a relative autonomy516
of the various networks and power dimensions is recognized (Kick & Davis, 2001;517
Hafner-Burton & Montgomery, 2009). Recent work points to a converging view518
on this point (Jacobs & Van Rossem, 2014b). This world-systems approach is very519
much interested in demonstrating the stability of core-periphery patterns over time.520
Contrary to certain views in mainstream scholarship, the world-systems approach is521
thus more skeptical about the possibility of vertical mobility in the world polity. The522
emerging powers are conceptualized as a semi-periphery. Recent work along these523
lines on the BRICs questions its validity as an analytical category as these countries524
occupy very different power positions in the global polity and that these positions525
are based on different sources of power (Jacobs & Van Rossem, 2014a).526
There is still a lot of potential for social network analysis of the global polity,527
although further development will necessarily be conditioned by the availability of528
new systematic data on various aspects of IRs and power. The research agenda529
includes network analysis of soft power networks, differentiation between centrality530
and autonomy as distinct sources of power, disambiguation of certain dependency531
relationships, further clarification of the meaning of globalization and its relation-532
ship with power dynamics, and linkages between international and intra-national533
distributional patterns.534
8 Conclusions and contributions to this special section535
The four papers included in this special section are focused on the global patterns536
of trade and production. As such, they use a variety of trade datasets to develop537
new measures, elucidate familiar cases with more depth, and add to the findings of538
the complex interplay of globalization, regionalism, and multi-polarity in the global539
system. Two take a more aggregate view (one comparing global value chains across540
countries while the other interrogates the impact of geographic distance on trade541
flows), while the other two examine specific sectors more closely (the oil industry542
and the automotive components industry).543
A strong illustration of the tension between regionalism and globalization is544
evident in “Distance-varying assortativity and clustering of the international trade545
network,” (Angela Abbate, Luca De Benedictis, Giorgio Fagiolo, and Lucia Tajoli).546
In this work, the authors embed the network of trade flows within geographical547
space. Using data from the International Trade Network (Subramanian & Wei, 2007)548
and covering the years of 1970 to 2000, they find that indeed, geographic proximity549
(not surprisingly) matters for strong trade partnerships, but not in a simple fashion.550
Using both weighted and unweighted networks, the authors examined the aggregate551
network, a traditional approach, but also created a series of subnetworks comprised552
11 On blockmodeling techniques, see White et al. (1976), Winship & Mandel (1983), and Wasserman &
Faust (1994).
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of ties only at certain distances (dividing the international trade network into553
distance deciles) and examined a number of topological characteristics of networks,554
node statistics, and some country macroeconomic characteristics.555
In the aggregate network, Abbate et al. found the recognized pattern of disas-556
sortativity in trade partners. Overall, countries tend to connect to partners who are557
different than them in measures such as connectivity. However, when considering558
only near-country trade a different pattern arises: countries located near one another559
exhibit a more assortative pattern of mixing, which countries with many partners560
tending to trade with other high-degree partners. This pattern smoothly reverses in561
considering networks of more distant countries, until the pattern of dissasortative562
trade showing that highly connected countries showing a strong preference to563
countries with far fewer ties. Intermediate distance networks showed no tendencies564
in this matter.565
Another network-level measure they consider is the differences in distanced-566
conditioned clustering coefficients. Previous findings that did not consider distance567
found evidence of strong clustering among countries and their trade partners, but568
examining the distance-conditioned networks reveals that this overall tendency is569
being heavily influenced by short-distance trade relationships. At high distances,570
the tendency weakens. This effect of distance with both assortative and clustering571
is somewhat attenuated by considering country-level measures such as GDP. In572
addition, the authors find that the importance of distance in trade evolves over time—573
disassortativity has increased for distant partners over time, reflecting increased574
participation by all countries in the network, just as clustering has also increased575
for near and far partners.576
Geographic distance and the role of networks also changes in importance over577
time in the case examined in the next paper, which tracks international trade in crude578
oil from 1995 to 2014. “The evolution of oil trade: A complex network approach”579
(Andrea Fracasso, Hien T. T. Nguyen, and Stefano Schiavo), considers bilateral trade580
data from the BACI International Trade Database for crude oil (Gaulier & Zignago,581
2010). Examining network-level measures such as density, centralization, community582
detection (modularity), and changes in geographic distances of trading partners over583
time, the authors find that the evolution of oil trade over 20 years has seen a broad584
reduction in traditional powers (such as OPEC), while new emerging importers585
(China, India) have changed both the community structure and the centralization586
of the network. Density of ties increases (more trade), while centralization decreases587
(less singular power). While the network ends as organized in several modular588
communities (which might argue for increasing regionalism or multi-polarity), the589
average geographic distance between partners within those communities increases,590
complicating a simple regionalization argument.591
Using the HITS algorithm to examine hubs in import and export combined,592
Fracasso et al. find that relative importance of exporters is related to (as one would593
expect) their share of global exports, but also the size of their reserves and the594
distance they are from the United States. Canada in this measure emerges as an595
outlier in its hub score as compared to its export size. Russia, on the other hand,596
is also a much large exporter but has a comparatively low hub score because of its597
connection to less prominent importers. China, in 2014, the second largest importer,598
has created a small community of African exporters rather than near neighbors.599
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Overall, the authors find evidence of an early phase of regionalization, but a more600
recent turn back to globalization of the oil trade, with a reduction in traditional601
powers and the emergence of new powers.602
Also, considering the emergence of rising powers in a multi-polar global system603
and its intersection with regionalism, the next paper in this issue, “Automotive604
international trade networks: A comparative analysis over the last two decades”605
(Sara Gorgoni, Alessia Amighini, and Matthew Smith), uses bilateral trade statistics606
on auto parts and components from the UN Comtrade database in 1993, 2003, and607
2013. Using highly disaggregated trade data at the product level to create directed,608
weighted networks for the case of the automotive industry, the authors examine609
the differences in trade networks of the electrical and electrical components, rubber610
and metal, and engines. They examine many factors, including size, composition,611
out-degree (number of export partners), weighted out-degree (value of trade),612
core-periphery structure of the whole network, centralization, and a weighted and613
normalized version of the E–I index. They also examine brokerage roles of individual614
countries within the network.615
As Gorgoni et al. found, the networks diverged in patterns by product types, with616
some regional leaders (Japan and Germany) acting as gatekeepers to strengthening617
regional networks. Over time, for the electric and electrical parts and rubber and618
metal (but not for engines), the trade network diversifies as more countries join, but619
the average value of ties decreases as exporting was spread across more countries.620
Accordingly, export networks for these products became less centralized. Electric and621
electrical parts also shifted over time into a slightly more core-periphery model, with622
China and Eastern European countries playing an increasing role as new suppliers.623
The engine trade network displayed a large move to the core-periphery model, with624
a small core of countries increasingly controlling a large amount of engine exports,625
while the rubber and metal trade network actually became less hierarchical. Specific626
product spaces connect regions to the international trade networks in different ways,627
such as through the heterogeneity of patterns over time by product type with respect628
to regionalization and the divergence of the roles played by traditional players629
in strengthening regional networks while rising powers (Brazil, Russia, India, and630
China). This points to a need to carefully attend to the level of aggregation of trade631
data, so as not to mask patterns.632
Instead of import–export flows, the final article in this section, “The similarity633
of global value chains: A network-based measure” (Zhen Zhu, Greg Morrison,634
Michelangelo Puliga, Alessandro Chessa, and Massimo Riccaboni), proposes and635
presents a more refined measure of similarity of countries than traditional export636
similarity measures by examining international production networks in sectors. They637
calculate the similarity of countries within sectors in upstream and downstream638
global value networks constructed from the global multi-regional input–output639
tables from World Input–Output Database, covering 1995–2011. They use a type of640
role equivalence for their weighted directional networks of countries, which considers641
the similarities countries have with other countries by their connections to other642
equivalent countries (but not necessarily the same countries, as would be required643
with structural equivalence). In generating this profile, which also accounts for self-644
loops and exogenous nodal attributes of the countries, they show that on average,645
sectors reveal an increasing trend of similarities over time. More variability could be646
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seen in sectors such as services, while manufacturing tended to be more similar. A647
temporary reduction in the similarities, particularly in the upstream ones, followed648
the 2008 economic crisis, but did rebound. Zhu et al. warn that increasing similarities649
point to increased systemic risk in international production networks as there is650
increasing overlap in trade partners along value chains.651
Taken together, these four papers add to the understanding of the heterogeneity652
of the response to increasing global trade ties. They remind us geography matters653
not always in a straightforward way (such as with increasing assortativity with654
increasing distance in the International Trade Network) and that power is not655
always residing in largest market shares, but is also embedded in relationships (such656
as with Canada and the United States for oil). They show that the structure of some657
industrial sectors can be more or less entrenched with strong patterns of dominance658
by traditional powerful countries (in the case of automobile engine production) and659
that economic risk can be increased by patterns of similar interactions (such as with660
global value chains). Network approaches such as these broaden our understanding661
of globalization, as well as of the complexities of its countervailing forces and662
alternative explanations.663
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